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ABSTRACT
AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES’ IMPACT ON WORKING MEMORY
Janine D. Mator
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. Jeremiah D. Still

Authentication is the process by which a computing system validates a user’s identity.
Although this process is necessary for system security, users view authentication as a frequent
disruption to their primary tasks. During this disruption, primary task information must be
actively maintained in working memory. As a result, primary task information stored in working
memory is at risk of being lost or corrupted while users authenticate. For over two decades,
researchers have focused on developing more memorable passwords by replacing alphanumeric
text with visual graphics (Biddle et al., 2012). However, very little attention has been given to
the impact authentication has on working memory. A recent exploratory study suggests that
working memory can be disrupted during graphical authentication (Still & Cain, 2019). In this
study, we take the next step by controlling for task difficulty and contrasting performance with
conventional password-based authentication. Baddeley’s model was employed to examine the
impact of authentication on verbal, visuospatial, and central executive working memory
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Our findings may help designers select authentication systems that
minimize adverse effects on users’ critical primary task performance. For instance, we revealed
that conventional passwords do not have a greater negative impact on verbal primary task
information compared to graphical passcodes. We also replicated findings reported by Still and
Cain (2019), where visuospatial was least impaired by authentication. These findings are not

intuitive, highlighting the need for further investigation of how authentication impacts primary
task information in working memory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Alphanumeric passwords have been a ubiquitous method of authentication since the
1960s (Sobrado & Birget, 2002). Although their continued deployment can be attributed to
benefits such as convenience and low cost (Herley & Oorschot, 2011), their security has long
been of concern (Morris & Thompson, 1979). Billions of passwords have been stolen through
brute-force attacks (Perlroth & Gelles, 2014), in which an automated program inputs different
combinations of password characters until the correct combination is found (Curtin, 2005;
Kirushnaamoni, 2013). Some brute-force attacks are especially effective at cracking weak
passwords (Herley & Florêncio, 2008), which contain dictionary words, predictable patterns such
as “1234,” or personal information, such as birthdays (Vu et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2010).
According to a report from Verizon Data Breach Investigations (2017), weak or stolen passwords
are responsible for more than 80% of breaches. To the user, of course, weak passwords are
appealing because they are easier to remember than strong ones (Wright et al., 2012). In addition
to omitting dictionary words and personal information, strong passwords typically require a
minimum length of eight characters, a mix of upper and lowercase letters, and at least one
number and special character (Raderman, 2017).
The security risk of weak passwords is escalated when users engage in poor cyber
hygiene (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012); for example, intentionally sharing passwords with others,
writing down passwords where others might see them, and failing to periodically update them or
create new ones for different accounts (Huth et al., 2012). When a password is reused across
accounts, a successful brute-force attack against one account can become a security risk for all
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others associated with that password (Wang et al., 2014). However, a survey of more than 20,000
users found an average of 130 accounts associated with a single email address (Le Bras, 2015).
Some accounts, such as email or social media accounts, may be accessed on a daily basis.
Others, such as DMV or social security accounts, may be accessed more sporadically. Frequency
of use is an important consideration for which authentication scheme is most appropriate to
protect a particular account. Applying an authentication scheme without considering frequency
of use assumes that the user is willing and able to manage that login credential (e.g., another
unique password) in addition to those they are already responsible for. Expectations from a
cybersecurity standpoint are therefore becoming impractical and inefficient from a usability
standpoint. In the trade-off between security and usability, the commonly held view is that
“increasing one necessarily decreases the other” (Biddle et al., 2012, p. 5). The resulting need for
authentication that meets dual standards of usability and security has long generated interest in
alternatives to the alphanumeric password (Biddle et al., 2012; Dhamija & Perrig, 2000).
Graphical authentication is one alternative that has been a subject of research for more
than twenty years (Biddle et al., 2012). Rather than typing a string of characters, graphical
schemes implement picture-based passcodes to authenticate (Sobrado & Birget, 2002). For
example, a user may be asked to select their passcode images from a grid of distractor images
(Brostoff & Sasse, 2000; Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; Hayashi et al., 2008). From a usability
perspective, graphical passcodes benefit from increased memorability relative to passwords
(Brostoff & Sasse, 2000; Moncur & Leplâtre, 2007), since pictures are more memorable than
text (Nelson et al., 1976; Paivio et al., 1968). From a cybersecurity perspective, graphical
passcodes are thought to be more resistant to brute-force attacks because it is more difficult for a

3
computer to recognize the many bytes contained in an image compared to the few contained in a
text character (Linju & Krishnan, 2014; Sobrado & Birget, 2002).
However, graphical passcodes face other cybersecurity risks. Of primary concern are
shoulder-surfing attacks, or over-the-shoulder attacks (OSAs), during which attackers observe a
user’s password or passcode input with the intention of replicating it later to gain unauthorized
access (Li et al., 2005). For example, an attacker within the workplace may employ an OSA by
closely watching a user as they select passcode images on a desktop login screen. The greater
memorability of graphical passcodes benefits malicious observers and the intended user
(Sobrado & Birget, 2002). Because it is easier to recognize passcode images from a set than to
recall and repeat a string of password characters (Still et al., 2017), OSAs on graphical passcodes
are made easier as well.
Some graphical authentication schemes have been designed to prevent OSAs (Lashkari et
al., 2009). The Use Your Illusion (UYI) scheme developed by Hayashi et al. (2008), for
example, prevents OSAs by distorting the quality of images and randomizing their locations on a
grid. When users are first assigned a graphical passcode, images are shown in their original
quality. When logging in, however, visual quality is distorted. This renders the passcode images
less recognizable to those unfamiliar with the original versions (Cain & Still, 2017; Hayashi et
al., 2008). To authenticate, the user searches a series of three 3x3 grids and selects each passcode
image located among eight distractor images. Multiple grids are implemented to prevent
unauthorized logins due to lucky guesswork (Hayashi et al., 2008). System-assigning the
passcode images also eliminates any personal bias from the user that may be evident to a
potential hacker, such as a favorite color (Biddle et al., 2012).
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Of course, users do not authenticate simply for the sake of authenticating. The login
process is less important for users than the task motivating them to log in (Sasse et al., 2001;
Whitten & Tygar, 1999). Ideally, remembering and inputting one’s password or passcode should
come at minimal cost to primary task information already held in working memory. Through
working memory, users can preserve one piece of information while processing a new piece of
information (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). In other words, working memory is a form of limited
and temporary storage that uses information from short-term memory to complete a task
(Baddeley, 2010; Halarewich, 2016). If authentication significantly interferes with working
memory, primary task performance may suffer. For example, suppose an employee is tasked
with sending a set of instructions to a specific email address. In that case, this working memory
load may be negatively impacted if the login process is overly taxing (i.e., typing a complex
password or selecting graphical passcode images that require complex visual searches). Of
course, there are more troubling consequences to forgotten working memory load than an
incorrect email address. Primary tasks while authenticating may be as critical as patient care or
heavy machinery's operation (Ghorsad, 2014). According to Trewin et al. (2012), “[…]
authentication is an interruption in the user’s primary task flow, and a disruption to working
memory. The greater the demands on working memory from the authentication process, the
greater the risk of forgetting aspects of the task at hand” (p. 160). To date, however, little
research has addressed how authentication schemes impact primary task information. This is
surprising, given how often users must authenticate. One study by Mare et al. (2016) found that
users authenticated an average of 45 times a day.

5
A recent exploratory study by Still and Cain (2019) measured the impact of graphical
authentication on the three components of working memory included in Baddeley’s model:
verbal, visuospatial, and central executive (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). In Still and Cain’s study,
working memory performance was measured for tasks that relied upon each component. Verbal
tasks required participants to remember four consonant letters, and visuospatial tasks required
them to remember the placement of four dots on a 3x3 grid. Tasks for central executive working
memory, which incorporates information from both verbal and visuospatial (Baddeley & Hitch,
1974), required users to remember the placement of four letters on a 3x3 grid. Once users loaded
their working memory, they were asked to authenticate through UYI and then report the working
memory load.
The results of this study indicated an overall negative impact of authentication on
working memory performance. With working memory tasks interrupted by UYI, users reported
correct information approximately 55% of the time. Although two other graphical schemes were
included in the study, they did not significantly differ from UYI in working memory
performance. There was also no significant interaction between authentication scheme and type
of working memory task. Across schemes, results suggested that visuospatial working memory
performance was best retained. There was no significant difference in performance between
verbal and central executive working memory. However, because load conditions were not
introduced in this study, performance may have been influenced by a confound of task difficulty.
Although some exploratory research has addressed the impact of graphical passcodes on
each working memory component, no previous study has addressed the same impact for
alphanumeric passwords. Comparisons between graphical and alphanumeric authentication are
therefore unclear in this domain. This is unfortunate, considering that comparisons are likely to
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be useful in informing the suitability of an authentication scheme for different settings. For
example, if one scheme has a significant negative impact on verbal working memory, that
scheme may be inadvisable in situations where users are frequently under verbal load. Because
alphanumeric passwords are comprised of verbal information, it is possible that they impair
users’ ability to remember other verbal information during login. Similarly, since graphical
passcodes are embedded with visual information, one might assume that they impair visuospatial
working memory. However, Still and Cain (2019) found that visuospatial working memory was
best retained after using graphical authentication. It is also unclear how the various
authentication schemes may influence central executive working memory, which necessitates the
storage of both verbal and visuospatial information.
An earlier study by Cain and Still (2018) assessed graphical authentication schemes by
usability as well. Participants indicated the pleasantness of their experience with each scheme,
also known as subjective satisfaction (Brooke, 1996). Overall, participants reported low
subjective satisfaction with graphical schemes (Cain & Still, 2018). Perhaps due to their novelty,
users have shown reluctance to use graphical passcodes in place of alphanumeric passwords
(Malek et al., 2006). Nevertheless, with passwords already so widely adopted, it is important to
gauge users’ reactions toward schemes like UYI as a potential alternative.
One way of measuring subjective satisfaction, as in Cain and Still’s (2018) study, is the
System Usability Scale, or SUS (Brooke, 1996). The SUS is a well-validated usability
questionnaire (Bangor et al., 2008) comprised of 10 questions on a Likert scale of 0 (“strongly
disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”) (Brooke, 1996). SUS scores ranges range from 0 to 100, with a
score of 68 indicating “average” usability (Sauro, 2011, p. 37). In Cain and Still’s (2018) study,
participants reported an SUS score of 64.53/100 for the UYI scheme when authenticating was
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their primary task. This study used the SUS to capture users’ satisfaction with UYI when
authenticating was their secondary task, and remembering unrelated working memory load was
their primary task.
Altogether, this study seeks to compare the effects of a newly assigned alphanumeric
password and UYI graphical passcode on working memory performance for all three
components. By incorporating both low and high load conditions, concerns about task difficulty
are removed. Using the SUS, we can also assess subjective satisfaction with graphical
authentication while under working memory load.
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CHAPTER II
AUTHENTICATION
Authentication may be classified as knowledge-based (something you know), tokenbased (something you have), or biometric (something you are) (Hayashi et al., 2008). Biometric
authentication, such as fingerprint-scanning and voice or facial recognition, is relatively quick
and easy (Bhattacharyya et al., 2009). However, a major vulnerability to biometric authentication
is the permanence of users’ data. In 2015, fingerprint data for 5.6 million federal U.S. employees
were breached in a cyberattack (Peterson, 2015). In this case, a major concern to security experts
was that users could not mitigate further risk by changing their fingerprints, as they can with
passwords and passcodes (Peterson, 2015). Token-based authentication (for example, proximity
cards) is another method that requires relatively low effort from the user (Hayashi et al., 2008).
However, they are vulnerable to theft and inconvenient to replace, resulting in delayed
accessibility for authorized users (Hayashi et al., 2008; Sathish et al., 2013).
Alphanumeric and graphical authentication are knowledge-based, requiring the user to
know a password or passcode (Biddle et al., 2012). In the literature of graphical alternatives to
alphanumeric authentication, UYI is a promising scheme that was developed to maintain
sufficient usability while providing defense against OSAs (Hayashi et al., 2008). However,
graphical schemes have both advantages and disadvantages to security and usability.
Cybersecurity: Resistance to Brute-Force Attacks and Over-the-Shoulder Attacks
Advantages. The wide variety of images employed in graphical authentication suggests
that graphical passcodes may be more secure against brute-force attacks. According to Suru and
Murano (2019), brute-force attacks use an algorithm that tests “all possible combinations of user
passwords” to hack an account (p. 26). The total number of possible passwords is referred to as
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theoretical password space (Biddle et al., 2012). For alphanumeric passwords, the theoretical
password space is restricted to combinations of numbers, letters, and special characters (Hu et
al., 2010). However, the theoretical password space for graphical schemes can be expanded by
increasing the library of images (Hu et al., 2010). By expanding the list of combinations to be
attempted, brute-force attacks become more difficult (Hu et al., 2010). The greater volume of
bytes may also hamper brute-force attacks that a computer must recognize in passcode images
(Linju & Krishnan, 2014; Sobrado & Birget, 2002).
Disadvantages. Unlike alphanumeric passwords, graphical passcodes can be directly
selected by tapping or clicking (Biddle et al., 2012). However, direct selection of images with a
mouse or touch screen means that some schemes are more visible to observers (Darbanian,
2015). This renders them more susceptible to OSAs (Li et al., 2005). Although OSAs are a threat
to alphanumeric passwords, input is usually concealed somehow (i.e., by replacing each typed
character with a dot or an asterisk). For many graphical schemes, image selection is less easily
concealed, and preventing OSAs while maintaining usability becomes a challenge (Darbanian,
2015; Lashkari et al., 2009). Developing authentication schemes that resist OSAs while
maintaining usability for the authorized user is a common goal in the literature (Hayashi et al.,
2008).
More usable graphical schemes, however, are often limited by smaller theoretical
password spaces (Biddle et al., 2012). For example, a grid with fewer images for the user to
consider will be more usable, but the theoretical password space will be reduced by the smaller
selection of images (Biddle et al., 2012; Schaub et al., 2013). This places more usable graphical
schemes at increased risk of brute-force attacks (Biddle et al., 2012). Schemes such as UYI
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mitigate this risk by increasing the number of grids to be searched, rather than the number of
images within each grid (Hayashi et al., 2008).
Usability: Memorability, Efficiency, and Subjective Satisfaction
Advantages. Interest in graphical passcodes as an alternative to alphanumeric passwords
has arisen, in part, from their potential for increased memorability (Biddle et al., 2012).
According to Gartner Group (2010), forgotten passwords are responsible for 20-30% of help
desk calls. Compared to the strings of characters contained in alphanumeric passwords, the
images contained in graphical passcodes are easier for users to remember (Brostoff & Sasse,
2000; Dhajima & Perrig, 2000; De Angelini et al., 2005). The memorability advantage for
graphical passcodes has been associated with the picture superiority effect, the long-held finding
that people tend to better recall and recognize images compared to text (Nelson et al., 1976;
Paivio et al., 1968; Stobert & Biddle, 2013). Whereas text is semantically encoded, images are
both visually and semantically encoded. The presence of both visual and semantic encoding
enhances recall (Paivio, 1979). Because passcode images are encoded in both forms, they are
easier for users to recall than passwords (Brostoff & Sasse, 2000; Dhajima & Perrig, 2000; De
Angelini et al., 2005). Even with distorted edges and colors, UYI passcode images remain
memorable. One week after receiving system-assigned passcode images, users demonstrated
94% login accuracy in Hayashi et al.’s (2008) study.
Disadvantages. Due to their novelty, graphical passcodes such as UYI require training in
a secure environment before they can be employed by users (Hayashi et al., 2008).
Alphanumeric passwords, being so widely recognized, do not typically require instruction before
use. However, the training phase for graphical passcodes need not be time-consuming. In
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Hayashi et al.’s (2008) study, the training phase for UYI lasted no more than five minutes. This
phase is also thought to improve long-term memorability (Hayashi et al., 2008).
Subjective satisfaction is another usability dimension needing improvement. Despite the
advantages of graphical authentication, users are resistant to change (Malek et al., 2006). When
asked whether they would be willing to switch from using alphanumeric authentication to a more
secure graphical authentication scheme, only 64.7% of users indicated their willingness to do so
(Malek et al., 2006).
User Selection vs. System Assignment
Several authentication studies have allowed users to select their own passwords or
passcode images (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; Forget et al., 2008; Goldberg et al., 2002; Vu et al.,
2007). However, such studies focus on the strength or memorability of user-selected passwords
rather than the effect of authentication on other performance measures. Passwords that are userselected vary in length and complexity, and thus their potential interference on working memory
would also vary from user to user. In comparison, studies in which passwords are systemassigned ensure the same level of difficulty across study conditions (Wright et al., 2012).
Similarly, for graphical authentication schemes, Cain and Still (2018) recommend systemassigned graphical passcodes to avoid user biases in image selection. For example, users might
select passcode images that are similar in color to reduce the effort required for detection.
System Usability Scale for Authentication
Although users are reluctant to authenticate using alternatives to the alphanumeric
password, many are also unwilling to strengthen their passwords (Warkentin et al., 2004). With
users resistant to both strong passwords and password alternatives, user satisfaction is important
in considering the deployment of graphical schemes.

12
The SUS has been used as a “quick and dirty” tool to measure user satisfaction with
authentication schemes in several studies (Bindu, 2015; Cain & Still, 2018; Chowdhury et al.,
2013; Fraune et al., 2013; Zimmerman & Gerber, 2020). However, none required participants to
be under working memory load while authenticating. According to Still and Cain (2019), “the
amount/type of working memory an authentication system drains might also predict its perceived
‘ease of use’” (p. 80). As a rule, user experience designers should avoid overtaxing users’
working memory to prevent information overload from making an interaction unpleasant and
unusable (Budiu, 2018). Greater working memory load strains users’ limited cognitive resources,
which may frustrate the user and diminish satisfaction with the interaction (Jen-Hwa Hu et al.,
2017). However, little research has explicitly measured the influence of load on users’ subjective
satisfaction (Jen-Hwa Hu et al., 2017). When participants in Still and Cain’s (2018) experiment
were simply asked to authenticate using UYI, they reported a mean SUS score of 64.53. This
score falls below the threshold of 68 for “average” system usability (Sauro, 2011). In this study,
we draw a comparison by measuring subjective satisfaction with UYI when participants are
under working memory load.
Authentication as a Secondary Task
To the user, authentication is merely an interruption to some other task (Subils, 2019).
Primary task information, such as a file name or confirmation code, takes precedence over
authentication (Chiasson & Biddle, 2007). Thus, when a primary task requires users to log in,
they are met with the dual task of holding primary task information in working memory while
inputting their password or passcode.
The ability to complete these dual tasks quickly and successfully is limited by the amount
of working memory resources that are available. More difficult tasks require greater working
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memory resources and therefore place a greater load on working memory (Kahneman, 1973). In
turn, greater load negatively impacts working memory performance (Eggemeier, 1988).
The type of dual task load may further influence performance. That is, how well the user
retains primary task information depends on the extent to which it demands the same mental
resource as a secondary task (Wickens, 1984). Wickens accounts for this intrusiveness through
multiple resource theory (1984). For example, if an air traffic controller’s primary task is to
gauge an aircraft's position, spatial resources will be consumed. If she is also tasked with vocally
acknowledging updates from the pilot, verbal resources will be consumed. Because the two tasks
do not draw from the same type of resource, primary task performance would not be expected to
change. However, if the air traffic controller’s secondary task also consumed spatial resources, a
negative impact would be expected (Wickens, 2002). In other words, the type of primary task
load affects the intrusiveness of the secondary task (Eggemeier, 1988).
With authentication as a secondary task, an authentication scheme's intrusiveness may
depend on the type and amount of working memory resources required by the user’s primary
task. The level of intrusiveness on certain resources may then inform an authentication scheme's
suitability for various work environments. When working memory performance suffers, the user
risks forgetting the information that may have motivated them to authenticate in the first place.
Therefore, it is important to understand how well different types of information loaded before
login will be retained after using a graphical passcode compared to an alphanumeric password.
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CHAPTER III
WORKING MEMORY
In this study, we seek to understand the influence of alphanumeric and graphical
authentication on working memory performance for tasks that vary in type and difficulty.
Specifically, we measure their impact on the accuracy of low-load and high-load tasks requiring
varying levels of verbal, visuospatial, and central executive working memory. To better
understand this relationship, we begin with an overview of the roles that information processing
and attention play in working memory; the three components of working memory conceptualized
in Baddeley’s model (1974); and finally, the difference between interactions with an
authentication system and mental representations of a password or passcode.
Information Processing: Attention and Working Memory
Before information enters working memory, it must be processed through several stages.
According to Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968), information first enters sensory memory, an initial
stage which lasts a few seconds at most. From sensory memory, information enters short-term
memory, which lasts approximately 15-20 seconds (Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959)
and has a maximum capacity of approximately five to nine pieces of information (Miller, 1956).
As a result of these limitations, attention plays a vital role in working memory by enabling focus
on specific pieces of information (Awh et al., 2006). In other words, attention functions as a
selective mechanism (Johnston & Dark, 1986) for information that is “most relevant to the
current processing goals” (Awh et al., 2006, p. 202). Rehearsal of this information enables its
maintenance in short-term memory and, potentially, its transfer to long-term memory (Atkinson
& Shiffrin, 1968). Working memory has commonly been conceptualized as a mental workbench
for both short- and long-term memory (Baddeley, 1986; Klatzky, 1980). In this analogy, short-
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term memory is represented by materials on the surface of the workbench, whereas long-term
memory may be likened to materials within reach on a nearby shelf (Klatzky, 1980).
Baddeley’s Model of Working Memory
Baddeley’s model of working memory (1974) introduced three components: verbal,
visuospatial, and central executive. Verbal and visuospatial working memory operate as
subordinate systems under central executive working memory, which integrates information
from both (Baddeley, 1974). One might consider the central executive a kind of business
executive, receiving input from its verbal and visuospatial sub-systems and then incorporating
both into useful business decisions (Baddeley, 1986). Figure 1 provides a representation of the
relationships between the three components.

Figure 1
Baddeley’s Components of Working Memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974)

Verbal. Under the central executive, verbal working memory is the subordinate system
responsible for briefly retaining verbal and written information (Baddeley, 1974). This process is
often referred to as the phonological loop, in which limited verbal information may be briefly
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held in the phonological store and sustained through rehearsal. Without sufficient rehearsal,
information held in the phonological store will be forgotten (Baddeley, 2002).
Previous studies have measured verbal working memory recall by asking participants to
memorize and report a set of random letters. In Helton and Russell’s (2013) dual-task study,
verbal tasks required participants to remember four letters while completing a secondary
vigilance task. In other studies by Desmond et al. (2003) and Chen and Desmond (2005), load
conditions were designated by one letter for low load and six letters for high load. For Still and
Dark (2010), low load consisted of two letters, and high load consisted of four. Overall,
testing recall of varying sets of letters is a prevalent method for verbal working memory tasks.
In Still and Cain’s (2019) exploratory study, verbal working memory tasks required
participants to remember a set of four letters, which they typed after using a graphical
authentication scheme. Overall, verbal working memory performance was found to be
significantly worse than visuospatial, but not central executive, performance (Still & Cain,
2019). However, the authentication schemes in this study did not include an alphanumeric
password. According to Wickens’ multiple resource theory (1984), the resources required by a
secondary verbal task should impair performance on a primary verbal task. Typing a recently
assigned alphanumeric password would require verbal resources from the user, whereas selecting
graphical passcodes would not. Therefore, verbal working memory performance should be
significantly worse after using an alphanumeric password compared to a graphical passcode.
However, this was not the case for an authentication study by Trewin et al. (2012), which tested
participants’ verbal working memory of a three-digit number and two-digit unit of measurement
(i.e., “152mg”). Participants entered the verbal load after authenticating with a biometric scheme
or system-assigned alphanumeric password. Verbal working memory performance after using
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the password was not found to be significantly worse compared to the biometric authentication
schemes. The lack of interference in this study may be due to the memorability of the relatively
weak password (“securit3”), which contained no upper-case letters or special characters and
closely resembled a dictionary word. No load conditions, graphical authentication schemes, or
other components of working memory were explored in this study.
Visuospatial. Visuospatial working memory, also known as the visuospatial sketchpad,
is the second subordinate system which acts as a “rehearsal system for visual input” (Benton et
al., 2005, p. 486). Examples of tasks that load visuospatial working memory include web
navigation, mental image transformations, and maintaining points of view (Ang & Lee, 2008;
Garden et al., 2002; Laberge & Scialfa, 2005; Schmidt et al., 2007). Whereas verbal working
memory would help remember a search phrase, visuospatial would help remember a file path, for
example.
Visuospatial working memory is also used to memorize images (Kak, 2011) and has been
suggested to play a role in visual search tasks, which occur when looking for one target among
others (Goldstein, 2014; Kak, 2011; Woodman et al., 2001). When authenticating through UYI,
visuospatial working memory is used to remember passcode images and search for them on a
grid of distractor images. Because of the demands that UYI places on visuospatial resources,
performance on another visuospatial task might be expected to suffer. However, Still and Cain
(2019) found that, compared to verbal and central executive, visuospatial working memory was
best preserved after using UYI.
One possibility for this finding is a distinction in visuospatial abilities. Previous research
indicates a discrepancy between the ability to remember spatial targets versus visual targets
(Woodman et al., 2001; Woodman & Luck, 2004). Because image positions change within each
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grid, UYI does not rely on the user’s memory for spatial information. Rather, it relies on the
user’s memory for visual targets, the passcode images themselves. Still and Cain’s (2019)
visuospatial tasks required users to remember spatial information: the positions of identical dots
on a grid. Therefore, even though UYI relies on visuospatial working memory to some degree,
the primary and secondary tasks, in this case, might not interfere with one another. A second
possibility is that participants encoded their passcode images through verbal working memory
(e.g., remembering the word “bicycle” rather than the visual bicycle in their passcode). In this
case, different resources would be consumed. As a result, we do not anticipate a significant
difference in visuospatial performance between graphical and alphanumeric authentication.
Central executive. Central executive working memory plays the critical role of
incorporating information from both verbal and visuospatial working memory. It has even been
considered “the core of the working memory model” altogether (Collette & Van der Linden,
2002, p.106). The more intricate demands of reasoning, decision-making, attentional control,
dual-task coordination, verbal fluency, and selective attention all fall under the domain of central
executive working memory (Blackler et al., 2010; Collette & Van der Linden, 2002).
Although many studies have implemented task-specific measures to assess verbal and
visuospatial working memory, central executive is less easy to fractionate as it incorporates
information from both systems (Baddeley et al., 2001). Whereas verbal working memory would
be used to remember a search phrase and visuospatial working memory would be used to
remember a file path, central executive memory would serve the more difficult task of
remembering some combination of the two.
In Still and Cain’s (2019) experiment, recall that for verbal tasks, users were asked to
remember four consecutive letters, while visuospatial tasks required users to remember the
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location of four dots on a 3x3 grid. Similarly, central executive tasks required users to remember
both the location and identity of four letters on a 3x3 grid. Although central executive
performance was found to be significantly worse than visuospatial, it was not found to be
significantly worse than verbal performance. This is surprising, given that central executive
working memory must integrate verbal and visuospatial tasks concurrently (Baddeley, 1974).
Password/Passcode Retrieval and Input
When users authenticate, two separate tasks contribute to overall mental workload.
Retrieval of the password or passcode itself presents one task, as users are loaded with its
representation in their memory. When the password or passcode is novel, as in our study, we can
expect this load to be rehearsed in working memory (Woods & Siponen, 2019). With enough
repetition and familiarity, however, passwords and passcodes start to become automatically
processed (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Interaction with the authentication scheme itself is another task. With UYI, for example,
the user must visually search for passcode images whose locations are randomized within each
grid. Because of this randomization, interaction with the UYI scheme requires controlled
processing – the ability to give conscious and deliberate attention to a task (Sweller, 1994). In
contrast, alphanumeric passwords are entered using keys with fixed, static positions on the
keyboard. Users may anticipate the consistent location of each character. The alphanumeric
scheme therefore engages automatic processing, which requires minimal working memory
resources without conscious or deliberate thought (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Sweller, 1994).
Altogether, several factors contribute to knowledge-based authentication, including the
user’s familiarity with a password or passcode image, representation of the passcode/password in
the user’s memory, and whether interaction with the authentication scheme requires automatic or
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controlled processing. Because the alphanumeric password assigned in this experiment is
completely novel to participants, lack of experience prevents its input from becoming an entirely
automatic process. With sufficient trials for rehearsal, password entry should become more
automatized. Although the visual search required by graphical schemes like UYI will always
require some level of controlled processing, their rehearsal also benefits users. Identifying the
same targets (e.g., passcode images) enables the user’s attention to become more automatically
directed toward the correct target (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).
Hypotheses
1. For verbal and central executive working memory, low load performance will be
significantly better than high for both UYI and alphanumeric authentication.
2. For visuospatial, low load performance will not be significantly better than high load for
both UYI and alphanumeric authentication.
3. Verbal performance will be significantly worse for alphanumeric authentication
compared to graphical.
4. The mean SUS score for UYI authentication will be significantly lower than 64.53.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Participants
To determine minimum sample size, we conducted a power analysis using MorePower
6.0, a software program designed to work with more complex ANOVA designs (Campbell &
Thompson, 2012). Based on the effect sizes from Still and Cain’s (2019) 2x3 ANOVA (partial η2
= .66-.81), we implemented the convention for a large effect size for partial η2 (.25) (Cohen,
1988). Solving for a sample size to achieve 90% power (α = .05) resulted in n = 26 (see
Appendix). However, technical error and COVID-19 restrictions on in-person data collection
reduced our final sample to n = 16.
Undergraduate (freshman and sophomore) participants were recruited through the SONA
Research Participation system and compensated with course research credit. It should be noted
that this sample reflects a long-held research bias toward American college students and
therefore limits generalization to a broader population (Sears, 1986). All participants were 18
years or older and reported having normal or normal-to-corrected vision.
Equipment
Two Windows desktop computers with 24” monitors were used to display working
memory tasks on the left and authentication tasks on the right. Standard desktop keyboards were
used for working memory task responses and alphanumeric authentication. UYI passcode images
were selected using a mouse.
Stimuli
Working memory tasks. All stimuli for working memory tasks were created and
presented through E-Prime software (v2.0.10; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Verbal task stimuli consisted of two (low load) and five (high load) randomly generated, non-
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repeating consonants. Vowels were excluded to prevent words from forming accidentally.
Visuospatial task stimuli consisted of two (low load) and four (high load) dots randomly
positioned on a 3x3 grid. Central executive task stimuli consisted of two (low load) and four
(high load) non-repeating consonant letters also randomly positioned on a 3x3 grid.
The number of items (i.e., letters) was increased for verbal high load tasks. Whereas
previous research demonstrates a capacity of 4 ± 2 items for visuospatial working memory, the
capacity for verbal working memory is comparatively higher when rehearsal of verbal load is not
suppressed (Chen & Cowan, 2009; Vogel et al., 2001). Classic working memory studies have
taken measures to suppress rehearsal of verbal working memory, often by asking participants to
repeat an irrelevant sound (Baddeley et al., 1975; Baddeley et al., 1984). In this experiment,
however, rehearsal was not suppressed. Therefore, to balance the difficulty of high load tasks
across working memory components, an additional letter was added to the verbal high load
condition.
Working memory task stimuli were designed to be fundamental representations of all
three working memory components. More “meaningful” stimuli (e.g., file names for verbal
tasks) might have provided greater ecological validity; however, such procedures might have
introduced potential confounds, such as memory aids (e.g., chunking). Rather than simulating
arbitrary real-world scenarios, this experiment utilized simplified tasks, well documented in
previous literature (Helton and Russell, 2013; Desmond et al., 2003; Bethell-Fox & Shepard,
1988; Miyake et al., 2001), to inform more practical applications.
Authentication tasks. The UYI authentication prototype was created and presented in
Paradigm Experiment Builder (v2.5.08; Perception Research Systems, 2007). The prototype was
based on the original scheme developed by Hayashi et al. (2008). Twenty-seven stock images
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were obtained through Pexels, a free-to-use website for open-source images, and distorted
through an oil painting filter on Gimp 2.8 open-source graphics editor (www.gimp.org).
Following original design recommendations by Hayashi et al. (2008), images were distorted in
such a way that colors and general shapes were preserved. A brushstroke size of 10 was applied,
following additional design recommendations by Tiller et al. (2018), to strike a balance between
low image distortion for easy recognition from users and high image distortion for defense
against OSAs.
For each UYI login attempt, one passcode image and eight distractor images were
randomly positioned on a series of three 3x3 grids. A random number generator was used to
determine the passcode image and distractor images in each grid, as well as their locations. Each
grid was 774x471 pixels, and passcode and distractor images were 213x175 pixels (see Figure
2).
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Figure 2
UYI Passcode Images)

Note. Participants were shown passcode images in their original quality when first assigned
(left). During login trials, participants were shown distorted versions (right).

Stimuli for the alphanumeric authentication task were created and presented in E-Prime.
Participants were assigned the same case-sensitive eight-digit password, Boga@411, for both
practice and experimental trials. The password Boga@411 meets the National Institute of
Standards and Technology’s requirements for password strength (Grassi et al., 2017).
Additionally, a security rating of 80% was calculated by the Password Strength Checker at
passwordmeter.com (“Password Strength Checker,” passwordmeter.com). This percentage
reflects a cumulation of password strengths (number of characters, inclusion of upper- and
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lower-case letters, and middle placement of numbers and one symbol), with deductions for
repeat characters (e.g., 11).
Procedures
All participants were presented with an informed consent form and given the opportunity
to ask questions before proceeding with the study. Participants were run individually. Once
seated in front of the monitors, they followed on-screen instructions to complete six practice
trials. Each practice trial reflected one condition of working memory component and load.
Instructions were stated as three goals: 1) Memorize information on the left-hand monitor, 2)
Successfully log in on the right-hand monitor, and 3) Input the previously shown information on
the left-hand monitor. Participants had one attempt to authenticate in each trial.
For the UYI scheme, the same three passcode images were used across all participants for
both practice and experimental trials. A login was considered successful when the participant
correctly selected all three UYI target passcode images. The researcher provided verbal feedback
(“correct” or “incorrect”) for each attempt. For alphanumeric password input, on-screen text
feedback was provided. A login was considered successful when the participant correctly typed
all eight characters. Participants were given an on-screen reminder of their password or passcode
images after every 20 trials.
For the verbal working memory task, participants were shown either two or five
consonant letters for 3000ms depending on the load condition. After authenticating, they typed
the letters in the same order in which they appeared. Letters were not case-sensitive. For the
visuospatial task, participants were shown two or four dots on an otherwise empty 3x3 grid. Dots
appeared for 3000ms, after which grid spaces were randomly numbered (1-9). Participants were
asked to look away from the screen as soon as the dots disappeared. After authenticating,
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participants indicated the positions of the dots by typing their corresponding numbers in any
order. The central executive task was executed similarly. On a 3x3 grid, either two or four letters
were shown for 3000ms. Grid spaces were then randomly numbered. A correct response required
participants to first type the corresponding number, followed by the letter previously shown, for
each letter. Responses could be entered in any order so long as each number was followed by the
correct letter (see Figure 3). Letters were not case-sensitive, and backspacing was not permitted
for any working memory task response.

Figure 3
Example of low-load central executive task

Note. A correct response for this task would be “6t4g” or “4g6t.”

After practice trials, participants completed a total of 60 working memory trials
interrupted by 60 authentication trials for each scheme (see Figure 4). This within-subjects
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experimental design included the following factors: 2 authentication schemes (alphanumeric
password or UYI graphical passcode) x 3 working memory components (verbal, visuospatial or
central executive) x 2 load conditions (low or high).
Ten trials were completed for each condition.1 To prevent fatigue and practice carryover
effects on working memory trials, presentation order of authentication schemes was
counterbalanced such that half of participants began with UYI authentication and half began with
alphanumeric. Presentation order of working memory task type was established using a Latin
square generator, resulting in the following three order conditions: 1) Verbal, Visuospatial,
Central Executive; 2) Visuospatial, Central executive, Verbal; and 3) Central Executive, Verbal,
Visuospatial. Within each condition of working memory task type, load was randomized within
E-Prime such that participants either began with 10 low-load trials, followed by 10 high-load
trials, or vice versa.

1

Pilot data collection required participants to complete 20 trials per working memory condition. However, this
resulted in a time shortage during the experiment. We therefore reduced the number of trials to ensure that
participants completed all tasks within the one-hour session and did not experience significant levels of fatigue.
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Figure 4
Workflow diagram of a single working memory task (verbal, high load) with embedded
authentication task
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
The primary focus of this study was the impact of alphanumeric and graphical
authentication on working memory performance. Only trials associated with correct logins were
included in working memory analyses, ensuring that participants were under appropriate load
during login. Due to technical error and the need to maintain resulting counterbalances, the
minimum sample size of 26 participants was not met (n = 16). Because the experiment was
conducted during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, public health restrictions on in-person
data collection prevented any additional recruitment. Technical error prevented five participants’
alphanumeric password performance from being captured; working memory performance from
these participants was therefore excluded. To maintain an even counterbalance of authentication
and working memory task order, data from three participants were also excluded.
Counterbalance orders for the remaining two participants cancelled out. In the reduced sample,
incorrect login attempts totaled 50 for the alphanumeric password and five for the graphical
passcode. As a result, approximately .03% of trials were excluded. Finally, outlier scores with zscores > 3 or < -3 were excluded, ensuring that analyses only considered trials in which
participants made an acceptable attempt to complete the working memory tasks. Two outlier
scores totaling less than .01% of the dataset were found from a single participant. An alpha level
of .05 determined statistical significance for all analyses.
Authentication Performance
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare authentication performance. Because
participants used both the alphanumeric password and the UYI passcode, this analysis was
appropriate to compare the paired observations.

30
A significant difference, t(1, 16) = -3.511, p = .003, between alphanumeric (M = 94.96,
SD = 5.80) and UYI authentication performance (M = 99.69, SD = .91) was found. Therefore,
authenticating by selecting UYI passcode images resulted in significantly fewer errors than by
typing the password. This is likely because UYI only required users to make three selections
with a mouse instead of the eight characters that must be typed for Boga@411, not including the
shift key.
Working Memory Performance
A 2x2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA examined the impact of authentication
(alphanumeric or UYI), load (low or high), and working memory component (verbal,
visuospatial, or central executive) on working memory performance. Along with determining
any main effects of these categorical predictor variables, the three-way ANOVA enabled us to
test for a three-way relationship among them.
Results indicated no such three-way interaction between working memory component,
load, and authentication (p = .802). There were no significant interactions between authentication
and load (p = .413) or authentication and working memory component (p = .122). Moreover,
there were no significant differences in working memory between the password and graphical
passcode under any condition. Because participants’ verbal working memory was not
significantly worse after using the password compared to the UYI passcode, Hypothesis 3 was
not supported. Interestingly, the interaction between working memory component and load was
found to be significant, F(2, 30) = 18.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .548.
All three main effects were also significant. The main effect of authentication, F(1, 15) =
4.69, p = .047, partial η2 = .238, revealed better overall working memory performance after
using UYI (M = 80.15, SE = 2.65) compared to the alphanumeric password (M = 75.84, SE =
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3.25). The main effect of load, F(1, 15) = 60.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .802, revealed better
performance when under low load (M = 88.65, SE = 1.92) than high (M = 67.34, SE = 3.96), p <
.001. Finally, the main effect of working memory component, F(2, 30) = 22.73, p < .001, partial
η2 = .602, was significant, such that verbal performance (M = 77.33, SE = 3.28) was better than
central executive (M = 67.63, SE = 3.99), p = .031, and visuospatial (M = 89.02, SE = 2.61) was
better than both verbal, p = .006, and central executive, p < .001.
To further explore the significant interaction between load and working memory, a 2x3
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on working memory performance (see Figure 5).
Simple main effects were explored through pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections. It
was found that when under low load, working memory performance was significantly better for
verbal than for central executive, p = .015. When under high load, visuospatial was significantly
better than both verbal, p < .001, and central executive, p < .001. Performance for low load was
significantly better than high load for verbal, p < .001, and central executive, p < .001, but not
for visuospatial, p = .331, which supports Hypotheses 1 and 2.

32
Figure 5
Working memory (WM) performance by component and load

Note. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Subjective Satisfaction
To test Hypothesis 4, a one-sample t-test was conducted to find differences between the
mean SUS score reported in this sample and the mean found by Cain and Still (2018). The onesample t-test is ideal when comparing a sample mean to the mean of a known population.
The SUS contains 10 items on a 5-point Likert scale, with scores ranging from 0-100.
Cain and Still reported a mean SUS score of 64.53 for UYI after initial use, where a score of 68
reflects average usability (Sauro, 2011). Although this slightly below-average score may have
been influenced by higher than recommended levels of image distortion (Tiller et al., 2018),
users were not under working memory load during the experiment and only completed three
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logins, compared to the consecutive 60 logins in this experiment. Using the SUS score reported
by Still and Cain, a comparison may be drawn for subjective satisfaction toward UYI after
participants were under load.
Surprisingly, results of the one-sample t-test revealed that SUS scores for UYI (M =
68.44, SD = 16.23) were not significantly lower than the mean score of 64.53 found by Cain and
Still (n = 20), t(23) = 1.179, p = .250, thus failing to support Hypothesis 4. In fact, the mean
score of 68.44 meets Sauro’s (2011) threshold for “above average.”
An additional item in the questionnaire asked participants to rate, from 1-10, whether
they would recommend the UYI authentication system to a friend (M = 7.14, SD = 1.96). Two
participants did not complete this question (n = 22). Overall, our mean of 7.14/10 indicates that
most participants found UYI usable enough to recommend to others.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Hypotheses and Findings
This study primarily investigated the impact of alphanumeric and graphical
authentication on working memory. To date, only Still and Cain (2019) have examined the
influence of authentication on verbal, visuospatial, and central executive working memory.
However, this exploratory study only considered graphical authentication schemes. In our study,
we included the traditional alphanumeric password for comparison and a high/low load condition
to account for task difficulty.
Contrary to Still and Cain (2019), we found central executive performance to be
significantly worse than verbal. This finding is more intuitive, given that central executive
working memory must incorporate information from the verbal and visuospatial components
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Participants also performed significantly better in the low load
condition compared to high load. This finding is consistent with previous studies in which
greater load leads to poorer working memory performance (Braver et al., 2007; Krimsky et al.,
2017). As expected, a significant interaction between working memory component and load
indicated that this effect was only observed for verbal and central executive working memory.
Whereas participants performed significantly better on verbal and central executive tasks when
load was low compared to high, this was not true of visuospatial tasks. For visuospatial,
performance between low load and high load tasks did not significantly differ. Thus, Hypotheses
1 and 2 were supported. In addition, high load performance for visuospatial working memory
was significantly better than high load for verbal and central executive. This further supports
Still and Cain’s (2019) suggestion that authentication poses limited visuospatial working
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memory interference. In other words, visuospatial task information appears to be most resistant
to loss or corruption during login.
When averaged across load conditions and working memory components, performance
was significantly better after using UYI than the alphanumeric password. However, no
significant interactions included authentication, thus failing to support Hypothesis 3. Based on
Wickens’ multiple resource theory, we predicted that verbal performance would be significantly
worse after using the alphanumeric password compared to UYI. However, we were surprised to
find that alphanumeric authentication did not significantly interfere with verbal working
memory. It is unclear why participants’ ability to recall verbal information was not hindered by
alphanumeric authentication. Both tasks presumably rely on verbal working memory, implying
some level of interference on primary task performance.
One possibility is that participants utilized “chunking” to better remember their password.
Chunking is a memory aid that enables a set of information to be consolidated into a single unit,
or chunk (Miller, 1956). For example, the phone number 757-555-8913 may be chunked into the
three units “757,” “555,” and “8913.” Previous research demonstrates that chunking strategies
facilitate better recall for alphanumeric passwords (Carstens & Malone, 2006; Nelson & Vu,
2010). Chunking can also reduce working memory load, thereby increasing storage capacity for
new information (Cowan, 2001; Ericsson, 1980; Miller, 1956). Through chunking, participants
may have consolidated the password Boga@411 into two (Boga and @411) or three (Boga, @,
and 411) chunks, reducing interference on the verbal working memory task.
Theoretically, multiple resource theory would also predict worse visuospatial
performance after using the graphical UYI passcode compared to the password. However, in Still
and Cain’s (2019) study using only graphical authentication schemes, visuospatial performance
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was better than both verbal and central executive. As a result, we did not predict that visuospatial
performance would be significantly worse for UYI, and our results demonstrate that this was not
the case. We attribute this finding to a few possible causes. First, recall that visuospatial tasks
can be further differentiated according to visual or spatial targets (Vergauwe et al., 2009;
Woodman et al., 2001; Woodman & Luck, 2004). Authenticating with UYI required participants
to remember visual targets (their passcode images), whereas the visuospatial task required
participants to remember spatial targets (the locations of dots on a 3x3 grid). As a result of this
discrepancy, the two tasks may have posed limited interference on visuospatial task performance.
Second, participants may have inadvertently benefited from their passcode images containing
distinct objects. Rather than remembering their passcode images' visual representation,
participants may have simply encoded the images as verbal information (e.g., “bicycle”). This
would also result in participants utilizing two different resources, verbal and visuospatial, thus
accounting for the lack of negative impact on visuospatial task performance. However, to the
best of our knowledge, our visuospatial task originally implemented by Still and Cain (2019) is
the only one to be implemented in a study of authentication on working memory.
Our final prediction was that participants in our study would report significantly less
subjective satisfaction for the UYI scheme compared to participants in Still and Cain’s (2018)
study, which did not require them to be under working memory load. Specifically, we predicted
that our mean SUS score for UYI would be significantly lower than their mean of 64.53.
Interestingly, the additional burden of working memory load did not appear to detract from
users’ enjoyment of this novel graphical authentication scheme. In fact, our mean SUS score of
68.44 met the threshold of 68 for average usability (Sauro, 2011). Although this unexpected
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finding failed to support Hypothesis 4, it demonstrates promise for UYI as an enjoyable
authentication scheme, even under potentially stressful circumstances.
Because usability data for alphanumeric passwords is biased due to their pervasiveness
and familiarity to users (Biddle et al., 2012), we did not collect measures of subjective
satisfaction for comparison. Trewin et al. (2012) reported a mean SUS score of 78 for the
alphanumeric password used in their experiment (“securit3”). As in our experiment,
authentication was interrupted by a working memory task. However, this password is less
complex than our “Boga@411”. It is likely that omitting uppercase and special characters from
their password and forming a near-dictionary word contributed to a higher SUS score than would
be expected for our alphanumeric password.
Finally, it should be noted that authentication with UYI requires the user to engage in
controlled processing. That is, finding and selecting one’s randomly placed passcode images
requires conscious and deliberate attention. As a result, UYI may be better suited for accounts
with intermediate use than accounts that must be accessed very frequently. In contrast,
alphanumeric passwords can be entered with consistently placed keys, and therefore engage
automatic processing if rehearsed enough. For situations that require frequent and highly
efficient authentication, passwords may be a better solution than graphical schemes like UYI that
rely on controlled processing. However, graphical schemes that rely on automatic processing
may be a suitable alternative for everyday use. For example, the Cued Click Points (CCP)
scheme developed by Chiasson et al. (2007) requires users to select the correct regions, or “clickpoints,” within a series of five static images. Over time, selection within these unchanging
images should become an automatic process. Future work might consider how familiar
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passwords/passcodes and graphical schemes like CCP affect working memory performance
through the user’s engagement in automatic processing.
Practical Implications
In our study, participants’ overall working memory was better retained after
authenticating with the graphical UYI scheme compared to the password, although UYI was an
utterly novel authentication scheme for them. However, we did not detect any significant
interaction between authentication and working memory component. This suggests that, while
recommendations for an authentication scheme in particular work settings are not yet clear,
graphical schemes such as UYI may have less negative impact on users’ primary task
information in general.
Because workflow interruptions lead to decreased primary task performance (Gillie &
Broadbent, 1989; Gupta et al., 2013; McFarlane, 2002), this finding holds significant
implications. In healthcare settings, for example, entering alphanumeric passwords has been
shown to interrupt practitioners’ workflow (Bardram, 2005; Frankel & Saleem, 2013).
However, navigating patient records requires frequent authentication to confirm the
practitioner’s identity (Bardram, 2005). This places working memory load (i.e., dosage of a
patient’s medication) at risk of being forgotten. Similarly, Electronic Health Record (EHR)
systems often require healthcare practitioners to load their working memory by piecing together
medical information between screens (Koopman et al., 2015; Mator et al., 2020). When
interrupted by authentication, the practitioner may unknowingly forget this information, leading
to incorrect treatment actions or improper care. In other high-stakes situations, such as
emergency dispatching, the user may also be tasked with remembering critical information (e.g.,
an address or set of directions) when they are interrupted by an authentication system. In cases
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such as these, lives can be saved by implementing the lighter system on working memory. Based
on our findings, graphical authentication is a promising alternative to alphanumeric passwords
with less adverse effects on users’ working memory.
It is important to note that some of our findings were unintuitive. Alphanumeric
authentication did not significantly interfere with verbal working memory, and graphical
authentication did not significantly interfere with visuospatial. These results contradict
predictions based on multiple resource theory, highlighting the need for empirically based
decisions in applied settings. Without empirical data, designers might make inappropriate
recommendations.
Currently, working memory is not considered as a design factor of authentication
schemes. Benchmarks, specifications, and usability guidelines are a much-needed tool for
designers, who ought to consider how different interfaces will benefit from users’ natural
abilities (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Still, Cain, & Schuster, 2017). The few existing benchmarks for
authentication schemes concern other user metrics, such as login time and accuracy (Braz &
Roberts, 2006). Although lengthy login times or additional login attempts may pose a brief delay
to the user, the repercussions of poor primary task performance may be far more damaging.
Users may fail to notice their errors until it is too late; e.g., until incorrect input on an EHR
system results in a patient receiving the wrong medication. Benchmarks for authentication
schemes would enable comparison between schemes and establish standards for post-login
primary task performance.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The present study explored differences in the impact that alphanumeric and graphical
authentication has on verbal, visuospatial, and central executive working memory. As expected,
low load performance was significantly better than high load performance, but only for verbal
and central executive working memory. For visuospatial alone, this difference was not
significant. We also replicated findings by Still and Cain (2019), where visuospatial working
memory was best preserved compared to verbal and central executive. This suggests that
visuospatial working memory for primary tasks may be more resilient to the impact of
authentication, a secondary task.
Overall, participants demonstrated better working memory performance after
authenticating with UYI, a graphical scheme, compared to an alphanumeric password. However,
alphanumeric and graphical authentication schemes did not vary in their impact on various
working memory components. This was surprising, as we anticipated that alphanumeric
authentication would significantly impair verbal working memory compared to graphical
authentication. Our hypothesis was informed by multiple resource theory, given that
alphanumeric authentication and verbal working memory ostensibly consume the same resource.
Similarly, graphical authentication did not impair visuospatial working memory any more than
alphanumeric authentication.
These unintuitive findings may have resulted from the characteristics of our graphical
passcode images. Each passcode image featured a distinct object, which may have enabled
participants to remember their labels as verbal information, rather than their visual features as
visuospatial information. With graphical authentication demanding verbal resources instead,
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there may have been minimal interference on visuospatial performance. Additionally, the UYI
scheme required participants to remember visual targets. They were asked to find and select each
passcode image (the “target”) among a grid of distractor images. Our visuospatial task, on the
other hand, required participants to remember spatial targets. In this case, they needed to
remember where identical dots were randomly positioned on a series of 3x3 grids. There may be
a distinction in the resources required to remember visual versus spatial targets, which would
also reduce the potential interference of graphical authentication on a visuospatial working
memory task.
Finally, we were surprised to find that participants reported greater satisfaction with the
UYI scheme in our study compared to Cain and Still’s (2018), even though participants in their
experiment were not required to be under working memory load while authenticating. This
demonstrates promise for UYI as an authentication scheme that exemplifies usability in addition
to security.
These findings will hopefully benefit designers in establishing authentication schemes
that best support users’ primary tasks. Forgetting primary task information is not only
inconvenient to the user, but may have greater consequences depending on the gravity of the
information. Emergency dispatchers and healthcare professionals, for example, must quickly and
efficiently act on life-or-death information stored in their working memory. Authentication,
although necessary to confirm users’ identities, warrants wider recognition as a contributing
factor to working memory performance.
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